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DE FACTO CENSORSHIP: ADULT CONTENT VIDEO
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Megan G. Rosenberger
When Alexander Hamilton wrote the Federalist
Papers, he anticipated a time would come when
the legislature would overstep its bounds.' And
just as he predicted, the courts would be in place
to rectify the situation when legislation ran con-
trary to the Constitution. Congress has implicated
this very situation by enacting section 505 of the
Telecommunications Act of 1996,2 which is in-
tended to protect children but may do so at the
expense of First Amendment freedoms.
The lower courts, acting in their intermediary
capacity, have reviewed this legislation and found
it contrary to the rights embodied in the Constitu-
tion. Now the Supreme Court, the ultimate inter-
mediary, will determine the final outcome of this
contentious debate. The Supreme Court heard
oral arguments for United States v. Playboy En-
tertainment Group, Inc.,3 in November 1999 and is
expected to issue an opinion by summer 2000.
4
Congress enacted section 505 to deal with a
phenomenon on cable television known as signal
bleed, which occurs when portions of the audio
or video of a particular channel can be viewed
although a subscriber has not requested that par-
ticular channel.5 Signal bleed is particularly prob-
I See Alexander Hamilton, The Federalist No. 78.
It is far more rational to suppose that the courts were
designed to be an intermediate body between the peo-
ple and the legislature in order, among other things, to
keep the later within the limits assigned to their author-
ity. The interpretation of the laws is the proper and pe-
culiar province of the courts. A constitution is, in fact,
and must be regarded as the judges as, a fundamental
law. It therefore belongs to them to ascertain its mean-
ing as well as the meaning of any particular act proceed-
ing from the legislative body. If there should happen to
be an irreconcilable variance between the two, that
which has the superior obligation and validity ought, of
course, to be preferred; or, in other words, the Constitu-
tion ought to be preferred to the statute, the intention
of the people to the intention of their agents.
Id.
2 Telecommunications Act of 1996 § 505, Pub. L. No.
104-104, 110 Stat. 56, 136 (codified at 47 U.S.C. § 561 (1994
lematic when subscribers receive programming
from adult channels despite scrambling by the
cable operator, in homes where such content is
unexpected. By enacting restrictive legislation,
Congress sought to protect children from acci-
dentally viewing indecent programming, ensuring
that they would not be exposed to such signal
bleed from adult channels.6
Although the government's intent to protect
children is laudable, section 505 is overbroad be-
cause it interferes with adults' recognized First
Amendment right to watch indecent program-
ming. As Alexander Hamilton predicted, when
the Constitution and a piece of legislation are at
odds, the Constitution must prevail. In this situa-
tion, the First Amendment must trump section
505.
7
This note explores the constitutionality of sec-
tion 505's restrictions on adult programming and
its effect on the cable services industry. Part I of
this note explains the procedural background and
legislative history of section 505, particularly why
Congress deemed it necessary to regulate this
problem and the practical implications of the reg-
ulation. Part II explores the progression of the
& Supp. III 1997)).
3 United States v. Playboy Entertainment Group, Inc., 30
F. Supp. 2d 702 (D. Del. 1998).
4 See Joan Biskupic, Justices Hear Arguments on Cable Smut
Restrictions, WASH. POST, Dec. 1, 1999, at A4.
5 See Playboy Entertainment Group, Inc. v. United States,
945 F. Supp. 772, 776 (D. Del. 1996) (discussing section 505
and its attempt to eliminate signal bleed). The district court's
opinion noted the "extensive and complex testimony" that it
heard "regarding cable technology and the mechanisms
available to comply with 505." Id.
6 Telecommunications Act of 1996 § 505, Pub. L. No.
104-104, 110 Stat. at 136 (codified at 47 U.S.C. § 561 (1994 &
Supp. III 1997); see also 141 CONG. REC. S8166-69 (statements
of Sens. Feinstein and Lott).
7 See U.S. CONST. amend. I (providing in part that "Con-
gress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of
speech").
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Playboy Entertainment Group, Inc. ("Playboy") case in
the district court, from the denial of a preliminary
injunction allowing section 505 to go into effect,
to the declaratory judgment preventing its en-
forcement. Part III illustrates the prior law rele-
vant to this case; specifically, how regulations of
speech are examined as content-based regula-
tions, time/place/manner regulations or obscen-
ity regulations. Part IV analyzes the issues the
Supreme Court will grapple with when it deter-
mines the outcome of Playboy. Finally, this note
suggests how the Court should resolve the issues
raised in the case.
I. THE CREATION OF SECTION 505
A. Why the Need for Section 505?
To understand the constitutional challenge at
issue, an exploration of the technical aspects of
signal bleed is necessary. A multisystem operator
("MSO") is a cable provider that packages avail-
able cable channels for distribution to subscrib-
ers.8 Generally, MSOs offer different packages of
a variety of channels, including blocks of basic
packages and premium channels for which sub-
scribers pay an additional fee.9' Additionally,
MSOs generally offer programming on a "pay-per-
view" basis, in which a subscriber places an order
for a specific program or period of time.10 Among
these premium and pay-per-view channels, the
MSO may offer the Playboy Channel and other
adult programming channels."
MSOs receive the signals for these channels
from a variety of sources, amplify the signals and
then retransmit them over coaxial cable into the
homes of cable subscribers. 12 Although premium
channels are transmitted from the cable head-end
to the homes of all cable subscribers,' 3 MSOs
8 See Playboy Entertainment Group, Inc. v. United States,
945 F. Supp. 772, 776 (D. Del. 1996).
9 See id.
10 See Playboy Entertainment Group, 30 F. Supp. 2d at 706.
When an order for a pay-per-view program is received, the
MSO unscrambles the signal for the viewing period and then
rescrambles the signal by remotely accessing a converter box
in the subscriber's home. See id.
I' See id.
12 See Playboy Entertainment Group, Inc. v. United
States, 918 F. Supp. 813, 817 (D. Del. 1996).
13 See Playboy Entertainment Group, 945 F. Supp. at 777.
14 See 47 U.S.C. § 560 (1994 & Supp. I 1997) (defining
scrambling as rearranging the contents of a signal "so that
the programming cannot be viewed or heard in an under-
"scramble" the signal as it is transmitted into
homes where subscribers have not requested the
channels so that they do not receive a discernable
signal. 14
Section 505 addresses the problem that arises
when the signal does not fully scramble and the
nonsubscribers can see or hear portions of the
programming on these channels.' 5 This problem,
the "partial reception of images and/or sounds
on a scrambled channel," is known as "signal
bleed."'16 The severity and pervasiveness of signal
bleed varies by place and time as weather, equip-
ment or human error contribute to the prob-
lem.
1 7
B. Congress Takes Action
Congress decided to intervene and regulate
adult programming signal bleed by enacting sec-
tion 505 of the Telecommunications Act of
1996.18 This statute requires MSOs to fully scram-
ble sexually explicit adult programming or other
indecent programming that is transmitted on
channels "primarily dedicated to sexually ori-
ented programming. '19 The amendment's goal is
to "protect children by prohibiting sexually ex-
plicit programming to those individuals who have
not specifically requested such programming.
2 °
Senators Diane Feinstein and Trent Lott pro-
posed the legislation on June 12, 1995.21 Senator
Lott stated that it was needed because "cable sys-
tems across the country are sending uninvited,
sexually explicit and pornographic programming
into the homes."22 He referenced studies proving
that young people were "acting out the behavior
they are seeing in this type of programming,"2
3
although no actual studies were produced at the
standable manner"); see also 47 C.F.R. § 227(e) (1998).
15 See Playboy Entertainment Group, 945 F. Supp. at 777.
16 Playboy Entertainment Group, 945 F. Supp. at 776.
17 See id. at 778.
18 See Telecommunications Act of 1996 § 505, 47 U.S.C.
§ 561 (1994 & Supp. I1 1997).
19 Id. at § 505, 47 U.S.C. § 561(a).
20 United States v. Playboy Entertainment Group, Inc.,
30 F. Supp. 2d 702, 710 (D. Del. 1998) (quoting 141 CONG.
REC. S8166-69, S8167 (daily ed. June 12, 1995) (statement of
Sen. Feinstein)).
21 See generally 141 CONG. REC. S8166-69 (statements of
Sens. Feinstein and Lott).




hearing.24 Senator Lott also suggested that the
rape of a six-year-old child by an eight-year-old
and a ten-year-old was the result of these children
being exposed to adult programming. 25 Little evi-
dence was presented on the Senate floor;
although the regulation was referred to as "a very
simple amendment," there was no discussion of its
First Amendment implications. 26 Thus, proposed
Amendment 1269 to the Communications De-
cency Act ("CDA") ultimately became section 505
of the Telecommunications Act of 1996.27
Congress perceived a need to further protect
the nation's children in section 505, although an-
other section of the Telecommunications Act of
1996 already offers a solution to signal bleed.
28
Section 504 requires MSOs to fully scramble or
block the audio and video signals received by a
cable subscriber upon the cable subscriber's re-
quest. 29 Because this service must be provided
free of charge, a family that wants to avoid signal
bleed has only to ask.30 Nevertheless, Congress
concluded that families do not fully understand
the signal bleed problem and that the govern-
ment must take the initiative to protect the na-
tion's children.
31
In effect, section 505 requires MSOs to take
costly measures 32 to block the signals for all sub-
scribers regardless of the subscriber's lack of con-
cern about signal bleed.3 3 Although this statute
passed with no floor debate in Congress, 34 it has
proved to be a controversial topic in the courts.
C. Practical Impact of Section 505
The statute in question requires MSOs to fully
scramble for nonsubscribers any adult program-
ming networks.35 However, the varieties of cable
technology currently in use for most systems
makes complete scrambling either impossible or
highly inefficient. 3
6
The majority of MSOs use "RF" or "baseband"
technology to scramble the signal of pay-per-view
channels that cable subscribers do not wish to re-
ceive.37 However, this type of scrambling, without
modification, is generally capable of making indis-
cernable only the video portion of the signal.
38
Other popular options include positive trapping,
in which the entire signal is scrambled from the
cable head-end and subscribers to the channel
must use a device installed at the home to un-
scramble the signal,3 9 or negative trapping, in
which the signal is transmitted clearly but a nega-
tive trap is installed in the homes of nonsubscrib-
ers to block the signal. 40 Additionally, MSOs that
provide pay-per-view service may utilize a system
of addressable converters, which the MSO can re-
motely access to send a signal that scrambles and
unscrambles the signal upon demand.
4 1
Signal bleed occurs in a variety of situations, de-
pending on the scrambling technology used. In
systems that use RF or baseband technology, sig-
nal bleed will occur because those technologies




27 See Playboy Entertainment Group, 30 F. Supp. 2d at 709.
28 See Telecommunications Act of 1996 § 504, 47 U.S.C.
§ 560(a) (stating, "Upon request by a cable service sub-
scriber, a cable operator shall, without charge, fully scramble
or otherwise fully block the audio and video programming of
each channel carrying such programming so that a sub-
scriber does not receive it").
29 See id.
30 See id.
31 See Playboy Entertainment Group, 30 F. Supp. 2d at 710.
32 See id. at 711 (stating that section 505 gives all MSOs
the "option of upgrading its technology from analog to digi-
tal transmission, of time-channeling, or of distributing chan-
nel-mapping capable converters, lockboxes, or positive or
negative traps to all their customers").
33 See id. at 712 (stating that less than one-half of one per-
cent of all cable subscribers requested lockboxes as per
§ 504).
34 See id. at 710.
35 See Telecommunications Act of 1996 § 505, 47 U.S.C.
§ 561.
36 See Playboy Entertainment Group, Inc. v. United
States, 945 F. Supp. 772, 778 (D. Del. 1996).
37 See Playboy Entertainment Group, 30 F. Supp. 2d at 707.
38 See id.
39 See id. Subscribers to cable systems that utilize a posi-
tive trap are given a device that is "attached to a cable-ready
TV or to the set-top converter box to filter out the jamming
signal." Id.
40 See id. The decision to use either positive or negative
trapping "will depend on whether the majority of subscribers
to the overall cable service also wish to subscribe to a particu-
lar premium service." Playboy Entertainment Group, 945 F.
Supp. at 778.
41 See Playboy Entertainment Group, 945 F. Supp. at 778.
Although utilizing addressable converters would eradicate
the problem of signal bleed, the cost of instituting this rem-
edy would be prohibitively high; addressable converters cost
approximately $115 per television set. See id.
2000]
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nal.42 Signal bleed may also occur when subscrib-
ers use cable-ready television sets, which, unlike
older sets, do not contain a feature called chan-
nel-mapping that prevents signal bleed.
43
The pervasiveness of signal bleed from adult
channels is an issue about which the parties are in
dispute.4 4 In the government's argument against a
preliminary injunction, it presented statistical evi-
dence showing the homes that potentially could
be exposed to signal bleed,45 along with "anecdo-
tal evidence of parents discovering that their chil-
dren have been exposed to sights and sounds
from sexually explicit programming." 46 The statis-
tics presented by the government illustrated that
of the approximate sixty-two million cable sub-
scribing households in the United States, roughly
forty million of these households "have the poten-
tial for a 'bleed' problem."4 7 However, the govern-
ment's statistics are overly broad, as they include
those cable subscribers who could "potentially" be
exposed to signal bleed, not those who actually
have been exposed to signal bleed, nor how much
of the signal bleed stems from adult program-
ming.48 During Playboy's declaratory judgment
phase, the court asked the government to present
further evidence of the problem, but it failed to
present any new evidence.
49
Section 505 forces MSOs to comply with the
regulation regardless of the existence or the ex-
tent of the problem. 50 Current technology how-
ever, provides MSOs with few viable alternatives to
facilitate compliance with the statute. 51 First, an
42 See Playboy Entertainment Group, 30 F. Supp. 2d at 708.
43 See Playboy Entertainment Group, 945 F. Supp. at 778.
"[W] hen a consumer with a cable-ready TV tunes to a scram-
bled premium channel to which the consumer does not sub-
scribe, the consumer receives the jammed signal which
under some circumstances includes a video picture or por-
tions of a video picture[,]" a phenomenon called random
lock-up. See id.
44 See Playboy Entertainment Group, 30 F. Supp. 2d at 708.
45 See id. (referring to the government's evidence that, of
the 62 million homes in the United States that receive cable
television, approximately 40 million subscribers do not have
blocking devices for signal bleed, so these 40 million homes
have the potential to receive signal bleed).
46 Playboy Entertainment Group, Inc. v. United States,
945 F. Supp. at 778.
47 Id. at 779.
48 See id. at 778-79.
49 See United States v. Playboy Entertainment Group,
Inc., 30 F. Supp. 2d at 708-09 (noting that the government
did not present any "survey-type evidence on the magnitude
of the 'problem' ").
50 See Telecommunications Act of 1996 § 505, 47 U.S.C.
§ 561 (1994 & Supp. 1I1 1997).
MSO may provide every subscriber of its service
with a channel lockbox programmed to com-
pletely block any signal from the specified adult
channel.52 Although section 504 already requires
all MSOs to provide lockboxes to any cable sub-
scriber upon request,5" it may be infeasible to re-
quire that MSOs do so for all subscribers due to
the high cost of each box.
54
A second alternative for MSOs is double-scram-
bling.55 One form of double-scrambling uses RF
or baseband technology in addition to a positive
trap.5 6 Although this option is less costly than dis-
tributing a lockbox to all cable subscribers, it
would still cost MSOs 50 percent of their revenues
from adult programming channels. 57 During trial,
neither side presented evidence of any MSO that
chose to comply with the regulation by using
double scrambling.
5 8
MSOs could also avoid signal bleed by upgrad-
ing their networks from analog to digital. 59 How-
ever, digital cable service currently reaches only
two million American consumers.60 Converting
entire analog cable systems to digital at this time
would cost in the billions of dollars, making this
the least feasible option.6
Notably, section 505 does provide MSOs with
an alternative until they comply with the statute; it
states that MSOs "shall limit the access of children
to [adult programming] ... by not providing such
programming during the hours of the day (as de-
termined by the Commission) when a significant
number of children are likely to view it."62 The
51 See Playboy Entertainment Group, 30 F. Supp. 2d at 706;
see also Playboy Entertainment Group, 945 F. Supp. at 780.
52 See Playboy Entertainment Group, 945 F. Supp. at 779.
53 See Telecommunications Act of 1996 § 504, 47 U.S.C.
§ 560 (1994 & Supp. 111 1997).
54 See Playboy Entertainment Group, 30 F. Supp. 2d at 711.
This has become a contentious issue among the parties in
this suit. See, e.g., Appellant's Brief at *33, United States v.
Playboy Entertainment Group, Inc., No. 98-1682 [hereinafter
Supreme Court Appellant's Brief]; Oral Arguments at *44-
45, United States v. Playboy Entertainment Group, Inc., No.
98-1682 (Nov. 30, 1999) [hereinafter Supreme Court Oral
Argument].




59 See id. Bleed also does not occur when MSOs transmit
the cable signal in digital form. See Playboy Entertainment
Group, 945 F. Supp. at 778.
60 See id.
61 See Playboy Entertainment Group, 30 F. Supp. 2d at 711.




Federal Communications Commission later deter-
mined that the prohibited hours extend from six
a.m. to ten p.m. 63 The creation of this eight-hour
safe harbor period, called time-channeling, is rel-
atively simple and has been the most popular
method of compliance among MSOs.
6 4
However, this restriction of adult programming
has caused difficulties for Playboy and other prov-
iders of adult programming.65 The obvious prob-
lem with time-channeling is that while it does not
affect nonsubscribers, it prohibits subscribers
from viewing adult programs during the safe har-
bor hours.66 This alternative also places a tremen-
dous financial burden on adult programmers.
67
Although the extent of the financial burden will
not be a crucial factor in determining whether the
statute passes First Amendment scrutiny, these al-
ternatives demonstrate the extent of the burden
that this regulation imposes on the cable indus-
try's First Amendment opportunities.
6
II. PLAYBOY'S CHALLENGE
Playboy initially applied for a temporary re-
straining order ("TRO") to prevent the imple-
mentation of section 505.69 Section 505 had
forced Playboy, as the provider of numerous adult
programming channels, to relegate all of its pro-
gramming from regular programming hours to
the "safe harbor" hours. 7°, Playboy argued that this
restriction on broadcast of its programming was a
violation of the First Amendment. 7' The United
63 See In re Implementation of Section 505 of the Tele-
communications Act of 1996: Scrambling of Sexually Explicit
Adult Video Service Programming, Order and Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking, 11 FCC Rcd. 5386, 5387, para. 6 (1996).
64 See Playboy Entertainment Group, 30 F. Supp. 2d at
711 (according to one survey, 69 percent of MSOs have re-
sorted to time-channeling in order to comply with section
505).
65 See id. at 718 (explaining the significant burden that
time-channeling imposes, the court stated that "time-chan-
neling amounts to the removal of all sexually explicit pro-
gramming ... during two-thirds of the broadcast day" and
"[s] ince 30-50 percent of all adult programming is viewed in
households prior to 10 p.m .... [section] 505 restricts a sig-
nificant amount of protected speech").
66 See id. at 711.
67 See id. (noting that the elimination of viewing before
10 p.m. results in a potential loss of 15 percent of revenue
through 2007).
68 See id. at 712.
69 See Playboy Entertainment Group, Inc. v. United
States, 918 F. Supp. 813 (D. Del. 1996).
70 See Appellee's Brief at *2, United States v. Playboy En-
tertainment Group, Inc., No. 98-1682 (filed Sept. 24, 1999)
States District Court for the District of Delaware
granted the TRO, holding that Playboy demon-
strated a "likelihood of success on the merits, ir-
reparable harm if relief is denied, that the govern-
ment will not be irreparably harmed if relief is
granted and that granting relief will not adversely
affect the public interest. '" 7 2 The district court
stated that the "implementation of section 505
will have a 'chilling effect' on the adult-oriented
cable television industry. '73 Furthermore, the
court found that section 505 was not the least re-
strictive means by which the government could
achieve its goal of restricting children's access to
adult programming because it would cause irrepa-
rable harm to Playboy.
7 4
The court of appeals overturned the TRO and
held that the statute would survive a challenge on
its merits. 75 In making its decision, the court
stated that section 505 was a "carefully tailored,
and constitutional solution" to the problem as-
serted by the government. 7 6 It also recognized
that section 505 was not a complete ban on adult
programming and that the statute did not restrict
consenting adults from viewing the adult pro-
gramming.
77
The most substantial factor in the court's deter-
mination was the court's interpretation of FCC v.
Pacifica Foundation.78 In relying on that decision,
the court held that time-channeling was a viable
alternative for adult programming, channels be-
cause it was upheld by the Supreme Court as a
valid option in Pacifica.79 However, the Supreme
[hereinafter Supreme Court Appellee's Brief].
71 See id. at *1; U.S. CONST. amend. 1.
72 Playboy Entertainment Group, 918 F. Supp. at 822-23.
73 Id. at 821.
74 See id.
75 See Playboy Entertainment Group, Inc. v. United
States, 945 F. Supp. 772, 792 (D. Del. 1996).
76 See id. at 787.
77 See id. at 789 (noting, "It is important to our reasoning
that § 505 does not seek to ban sexually explicit program-
ming, nor does it prohibit consenting adults from viewing
erotic material on premium cable networks if they so de-
sire").
78 See FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U.S. 726 (1978)
(upholding the FCC's regulation of a broadcast radio mono-
logue that contained patently offensive sexual and excretory
language; the Court stated that although the language was
not obscene language that would normally receive minimal
First Amendment protection if any, this language nonethe-
less was "not entitled to absolute constitutional protection
under all circumstances").
79 See Playboy Entertainment Group, 945 F. Supp. at 789
(stating that since "the Supreme Court endorsed a time-
channeling solution in very similar circumstances in Pacifica,
20001
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Court's subsequent examination of content-based
restrictions since Pacifica raises the question of
whether Pacifica would be upheld in the context
of adult-oriented cable programming.8" The
Court has noted that there are fundamental tech-
nological differences between cable television and
broadcast television (specifically, the cable indus-
try does not contend with the limited number of
frequencies allocated to broadcast television);
therefore, the Court has concluded that this sig-
nificant difference requires a more lenient First
Amendment analysis for broadcast television."'
Following this comparison, it would appear that
the Pacifica analysis would not sustain a similar
regulation imposed on the cable industry. None-
theless, the United States Supreme Court af-
firmed the lower court's denial of a TRO without
issuing an opinion .
2
Following these proceedings, section 505 be-
came effective. The enforcement of the statute
opened the door for Playboy to renew its proceed-
ings.8 3 On December 28, 1998, the United States
District Court for the District of Delaware granted
Playboy a declaratory judgment against the en-
forcement of the statute.8 4 The court held that
although the government proved it had a compel-
ling interest, the statute was nonetheless unconsti-
we believe that time-channeling also survives constitutional
scrutiny here"). But see Amicus Brief of the National Cable
Television Association at *8, United States v. Playboy En-
tertainment Group, Inc., No. 98-1682 (filed Sept. 24, 1999)
(asserting the less than strict scrutiny advanced in Pacifica was
the result of the scarce spectrum available in broadcast;
whereas the less than strict scrutiny should not apply to cable
regulation because the cable programming is "less pervasive"
than broadcast).
86 Cf Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S.
622, 637 (1994) (stating "the rationale for applying a less rig-
orous standard of First Amendment scrutiny to broadcast
regulation ... does not apply in the context of cable regula-
tion").
s See id. at 637-38.
82 See Playboy Entertainment Group, Inc. v. United
States, 520 U.S. 1141 (1997); see also United States v. Playboy
Entertainment Group Inc., 30 F. Supp. 2d 702, 705 (D. Del.
1998) (referring to the court's affirmation of the denial of a
temporary restraining order). It is likely that although it rec-
ognized the importance of the case, the court did not issue
an opinion because Playboy would have further grounds for
challenging the regulation after it was enforced against the
company. At that point, Playboy would be able to challenge
the substance of section 505.
83 See Playboy Entertainment Group, 30 F. Supp. 2d at 705.
84 See id. at 719.
85 See id. at 717-18.
86 See id. at 718 (in determining whether section 504 was
a less restrictive alternative to section 505, the court ex-
tutional because it was not the least restrictive
means by which to accomplish the goals sought.
8 5
Particularly, the court stated that effective en-
forcement of section 504 was a less restrictive al-
ternative for dealing with the problem of signal
bleed.86
The Supreme Court recently granted certiorari
to reconsider the constitutionality of section 505
and heard oral arguments on November 30,
1999.87
III. FINDING THE APPROPRIATE FIRST
AMENDMENT ANALYSIS
Although the First Amendment initially may
have been intended to protect only political de-
bate, 88 scholars have realized that "even if one
could distinguish between illegitimate and legiti-
mate speech, it may still be necessary to protect all
speech in order to afford real protection for legiti-
mate speech."' Yet, the First Amendment is not
interpreted as an absolute right.90 It has been said
that "[t] he First Amendment is not the guardian
of unregulated talkativeness." ' I Thus, in order to
implement the appropriate level of protection,
one must first determine the type of speech at is-
sue.
9 2
plained that it must examine "the relative burden of one so-
lution versus another." The court found that because section
504 provides for "voluntary blocking .... neither Playboy nor
its subscribers will suffer any First Amendment ill-effects...
[and f]or that reason, [section] 504 is not restrictive of any-
one's First Amendment rights and is clearly 'less restric-
tive' ").
87 See United States v. Playboy Entertainment Group,
Inc., 119 S. Ct. 2365 (1999) (noting probable jurisdiction);
Paige Albiniak, Bunny Gets High Court's Ear; Playboy Argues
Before Supreme Court, BROADCASTING & CABLE, Dec. 6, 1999, at
22 (reporting that following the oral arguments, some "ob-
servers" on both sides predicted that the Court would rule
for Playboy).
88 See JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTrru-
TiONAL LAW § 16.6, at 941 n.12 (4th ed. 1991) (stating that "it
has been argued that protection should only be afforded to
explicitly political speech, and not to scientific, literary or ob-
scene speech").
89 id. at § 16.6, 941.
90 See id. at § 16.7, 942 (stating that "[a]n absolute right,
by definition, is not subject to balancing").
911 Id. at § 16.6, 939-40 (quoting A. MEIKLEJOHN, FREE
SPEEC-I AND ITS RELATION TO SELF GOVERNMENT no. 26
(1948)).
92 See id. at § 16.7, 943 (comparing Justice Black's absolu-
tist approach to the First Amendment with Justice Harlan's
balancing approach; also noting that "Harlan's balancing ap-
proach is not inconsistent with the language of the first
amendment. It is not 'speech' that is being absolutely pro-
[Vol. 8
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A. Levels of First Amendment Protection
To safeguard the various types of speech enti-
tled to varying degrees of First Amendment pro-
tection, the Supreme Court has developed differ-
ent levels of scrutiny. When a regulation is subject
to First Amendment analysis, it is first generally
categorized as a content-based regulation,93 an
obscenity regulation,9 4 or a time, place and man-
ner regulation.
95
Content-based regulations receive strict scrutiny
because they purport to directly regulate the sub-
stance of the message.911 The Court has deter-
mined that there are two requirements that the
government must meet in order to validate a con-
tent-based regulation. First, the government must
have a compelling interest to protect, and second,
the regulation must be the least restrictive means
available to protect this interest.
97
At the opposite end of the spectrum is the anal-
ysis applied to the regulation of obscene speech.
The Court has held that the regulation of obscene
speech will receive less than intermediate scrutiny
because obscene speech has a low social value and
the government has a legitimate interest in pro-
tecting society from such speech. 98 In the Playboy
case, both parties stipulated that the speech at is-
sue is indecent rather than obscene.9 9 Therefore,
the regulation at issue will be subject to a higher
tected from restriction but only 'free speech' ").
93 See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 381 (1992)
(describing content-based regulations as presumptively inva-
lid regulations that prohibit speech "solely on the basis of the
subjects the speech address").
94 SeeMiller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973) (stating
that the Court's definition of obscenity has developed into a
three-part test: "(a) whether the average person, applying
contemporary community standards, would find that the
work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest; ...
(b) whether the work depicts or describes, in a patently of-
fensive way, sexual conduct specifically defined by the state
law; and (3) whether the work taken as a whole, lacks serious
literary, artistic, political or scientific value").
95 See Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 47
(1986) (upholding a zoning ordinance as a valid time, place
and manner regulation of adult theaters since the regulation
did not "unreasonably limit alternative avenues of communi-
cation").
96 See United States v. Playboy Entertainment Group,
Inc., 30 F. Supp. 2d 702, 715 (D. Del. 1998) (stating that
"Congress's targeting of signal bleed of solely sexually ex-
plicit programming is a content-based restriction").
97 See id.
98 See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 18-23 (1973); cf
Sable Communications of California, Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S.
115, 131 (1989) (upholding a regulation banning "obscene"
level of scrutiny than one restricting obscene
speech.
Time, place and manner regulations, which re-
ceive intermediate scrutiny, lie between content-
based and obscenity regulations.100 When the gov-
ernment seeks to restrict speech by regulating the
particular time, place or manner in which it is
presented, the regulation must be "designed to
serve a substantial government interest and . . .
not unreasonably limit alternative avenues of
communication."' 0 ' Generally, regulations aimed
at the secondary effects of the speech are deemed
content-neutral regulations.' 02Under this "secon-
dary effects" doctrine, the Court has upheld local
zoning ordinances that regulate the location of
adult theaters."' 3 The Court reasoned that a city
could regulate adult theaters if the regulation is
aimed at preventing deterioration of the sur-
rounding neighborhoods rather than suppressing
speech. 0 4 A crucial element of this doctrine is
that the regulated speech must be left with alter-
native avenues of dissemination.'
0 5
B. Section 505 is a Content-Based Restriction
That Must be Subjected to Strict Scrutiny.
Section 505 explicitly regulates the content of
video service channels that are primarily dedi-
dial-a-porn telephone messages but invalidating that portion
of the regulation banning all dial-a-porn telephone messages
since indecent (but not obscene) sexual expression is enti-
tled to First Amendment protection).
99 See Playboy Entertainment Group, Inc. v. United
States, 918 F. Supp. 813, 819 (D. Del. 1996) (referring to the
fact that Playboy employs full time attorneys who view all of
the Playboy programming to assure that the programming is
not obscene programming and that it does not violate any
community standards).
100 See Renton, 475 U.S. at 50 (upholding an adult zoning
regulation prohibiting adult theaters in certain neighbor-
hoods after finding that the regulation served the substantial
government interest of preventing the harmful "secondary
effects" caused by the presence of such theaters and that the
city government allowed for "reasonable alternative avenues
of communication").
101 Id. at 47.
102 See id. at 47-48.
103 See id. at 49; Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc.,
427 U.S. 50, 71-73 (1976) (upholding a zoning regulation of
adult theaters because its purpose was to reduce the deleteri-
ous secondary effects that these theaters had on the neigh-
borhoods and not to restrict the offensive speech).
104 See Renton, 475 U.S. at 48-49.
105 See id. at 50.
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cated to adult programming. 0 6 The government
has created a content-based restriction by singling
out the signal bleed from adult programming
channels'117-signal bleed from other channels is
not restricted.1 08 Thus, section 505 employs con-
tent-based discrimination "in the strong sense of
suppressing a certain form of expression that the
Government dislikes or otherwise wishes to ex-
clude on account of its effects." 109 There should
be no justification for anything less than strict
scrutiny to be applied in analyzing this issue.
The government argued that section 505 is
aimed at the deleterious secondary effects of sig-
nal bleed rather than at the effects of adult pro-
gramming, thus necessitating a content-neutral
analysis.°10 This argument may stand if the statute
regulated signal bleed from all adult program-
ming (including that adult content occasionally
appearing on other premium channels). I ' In-
stead, the argument fails because the government
has chosen to regulate only premium channels
devoted entirely to adult content.' 1 2 If the govern-
ment is concerned about the effects of signal
bleed from all adult programming, then any chan-
nel showing sexually explicit programming
should be required to comply with section 505.1'3
Because this is not the case, the government's ar-
116 See Telecommunications Act of 1996 § 505, 47 U.S.C.
§ 561 (1994 & Supp. II1 1997).
107 See United States v. Playboy Entertainment Group,
Inc., 30 F. Supp. 2d 702, 715 (D. Del. 1998).
lOB See id. at 714-t5 (stating that "[s]ignal bleed from the
Disney Channel, for example, does not come within the pur-
view of the statute"); Amicus Brief of the Media Institute at
*4, United States v. Playboy Entertainment Group, Inc., No.
98-1682 (filed Sept. 24, 1999) (referring to the fact that
although Home Box Office shows programming similar to
the Playboy Channel, it is not regulated by section 505).
'09 Denver Area Educ. Telecomm. Consortium v. FCC,
518 U.S. 727, 802 (1996) (holding, in part, that a regulation
allowing cable operators to prohibit patently offensive and
indecent programming violates the First Amendment). See
also R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 382 (1992) (stat-
ing, "Content-based regulations are presumptively invalid").
' See Playboy Entertainment Group, 30 F. Supp. 2d at 714.
See Telecommunications Act of 1996 § 505, 47 U.S.C.
§ 561 (regulating only adult programming that is shown on
channels "primarily dedicated to adult programming").
112 See Playboy Entertainment Group, Inc. v. United
States, 945 F. Stipp. 772, 785 (D. Del. 1996) (noting that
"[e]ven though § 505 is aimed at the content-neutral objec-
tive of preventing signal bleed, the section applies only when
signal bleed occurs during the transmission of 'sexually ex-
plicit adult programming or other programming that is inde-
cent' " (quoting § 505, codified at 47 U.S.C. § 561 (1994 &
Supp. 11 1997))).
113 See David L. Htudson, Jr., The Secondary Effects Doctrine:
gument will most likely fail. The Court therefore
will treat the provision as restraining content, thus
invoking strict scrutiny.
1. Applying Strict Scrutiny to Section 505:
Establishing Compelling Interests
When the Court applies strict scrutiny, the gov-
ernment will first have to establish that the regula-
tion is intended to protect compelling inter-
ests.1 14 The government contends that the
following interests are compelling:
(1) the Government's interest in the well-being of the
nation's youth-the need to protect children from ex-
posure to patently offensive sex-related material; 2) the
Government's interest in supporting parental claims of
authority in their own household-the need to protect
parents' rights to inculcate morals and beliefs on their
children; and 3) the Government's interest in ensuring
the individual's right to be left alone in the privacy of
his or her home-the need to protect households from
unwanted sexual communications. 115
Following Supreme Court precedent, the lower
courts agreed that these are indeed, compelling
interests for the government to promote."
6
Although these interests may be compelling, how-
ever, there is little evidence to show that signal
bleed threatens these interests.' 17 Given the mini-
"The Evisceration of First Amendment Freedoms, " 37 WASHBURN
L.J. 55, 59 (1997) (stating that "t]he secondary effects doc-
trine has become a favorite tool for government' officials who
seek to disguise content-based regulations").
114 See United States v. Playboy Entertainment Group,
Inc., 30 F. Supp. 2d 702, 715 (D. Del. 1998) (describing the
procedure the court states that the government bears the
burden of establishing' that "its interests are compelling and
that the means chosen 'are careflly tailored to achieve those
ends' ").
115 Id.
I 16 See, e.g., id. at 715-18; Playboy Entertainment Group, 945
F. Supp. at 785-86.
117 See Amicus Brief for Sexuality Scholars, Researchers
and Therapists at *15, United States v. Playboy Entertain-
ment Group, Inc., No. 98-1682 (filed Sept. 24, 1999) [herein-
after Sexuality Scholars Brief] (asserting that the government
has not established its burden of proving a compelling inter-
est in protecting children from signal bleed exists since it did
not present sufficient evidence of harm); but see 16A Am. Jur.
2d Constitutional Law § 171 (1998) (stating, "There. is a
strong presumption that a legislature understands and cor-
rectly appreciates the needs of its own people, that its laws
are directed to problems made manifest by experience, and
that its discriminations are based upon adequate grounds")
Furthermore, if evidence of certain facts is required for a leg-
islature to properly pass a statute, "it is presumed that such




mal evidence, it is argued that the government
has not met its burden of proving that signal
bleed from sexually explicit programming is
harmful to children.' 's
In 1996, the district court stated that the results
of a study conducted by the government's expert
witness were "anecdotal and possibly mislead-
ing."119 Playboy's expert witnesses testified that
"there is no empirical evidence of psychological
harm to minors from exposure to sexually explicit
videos, no less to signal bleed," 120 and the govern-
ment's witness did not refute that testimony.'
2'
Again in 1998, the district court stated that the
government had presented "no clinical evidence
linking child viewing of pornography to psycho-
logical harms."122 Despite these findings, the dis-
trict court held that the government had met its
burden because only "some evidence of harm
short of definitive scientific proof must be
presented. '" 123 Arguably, the court relied on "du-
bious and inadequate evidence" to find that the
government had established a compelling inter-
est.
124
It is clear that the Supreme Court recognizes
the importance of protecting children from inde-
cent material. 125 However, no case has yet asked
the Court whether signal bleed of indecent mate-
rial is a potential harm to children. The Court has
not "even contemplated the claim that fleeting
sounds or images from indecent signal bleed
could be harmful to youth." 12 6 Rather, the gov-
ernment's argument is based on an analogy be-
tween the effect of television violence on children
118 See Sexuality Scholars Brief, supra note 117, at * 15.
119 Playboy Entertainment Group, Inc. v. United States,
918 F. Supp. 772, 813 (D. Del. 1996).
120 Sexuality Scholars Brief, supra note 117, at *3.
121 See id.
122 United States v. Playboy Entertainment Group, Inc.,
30 F. Supp. 2d 702, 716 (D. Del. 1998).
123 Id.
124 See Sexuality Scholars Brief, supra note 117, at *6-7.
125 See United States v. Playboy Entertainment Group,
Inc., 30 F. Supp. 2d 702, 715-16 (D. Del. 1998) (referring to
Bethel School Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675 (1986)
(holding that a school's disciplinary actions taken as a result
of a student's speech using indecent speech did not violate of
the First Amendment); Action for Children's Television v.
FCC, 58 F.3d. 654 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (remanding the case to
redesign the FCC regulation that prohibited indecent pro-
gramming from being shown between 6 a.m. and midnight;
the court ruled that the regulation was unconstitutional after
applying strict scrutiny-it was not the least restrictive means
to achieve the government's interest); Ginsburg v. New York,
390 U.S. 629 (1968) (upholding a New York statute that pro-
hibited the sale of obscene materials to minors after finding
and the effect of pornography on children. 27
While the government's evidence is far from con-
clusive, it is likely that the Court will accept the
minimal evidence based on its precedent of pro-
tecting children from indecent material.1
28
2. Finding the Least Restrictive Means
The crux of this issue lies within the second
prong of the Court's analysis: whether this regula-
tion is the least restrictive means available to meet
the government's asserted interest. 29 The govern-
ment asserts that this regulation is the only viable
means by which it can satisfy its compelling inter-
ests.1 30 However, there are several alternatives
that can satisfy the government's interest in pro-
tecting children from indecent programming.
a. Section 504
First, section 504 is a viable and a less restrictive
alternative. Under section 504, any cable sub-
scriber is entitled to request a lockbox, in which
any programming (whether or not it is sexually
explicit) could be completely blocked, free of
charge.' 3' The United States District Court for
the District of Delaware noted that the "basic dif-
ference between section 504 and section 505 is in
determining who takes the initiative to remediate
the signal bleed problem. '" 132 While section 505
requires the MSOs to take the initiative and fully
scramble the adult programming channels, sec-
tion 504 enables parents to have the adult pro-
that the statute bore a rational relation to the government's
interest in protecting minors from obscene materials); Paris
Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49 (1973) (remanding a
challenge to the Georgia laws that regulated adult theaters
and the obscene material that is shown therein)).
126 Sexuality Scholars Brief, supra note 117, at *8.
127 See Playboy Entertainment Group, 30 F. Stipp. 2d at 716.
128 See supra note 125, discussing the Court's precedent.
129 See Playboy Entertainment Group, 30 F. Supp. 2d at 717
(assuming that the government's interest may be compelling,
the court next must determine "whether § 505 is narrowly
tailored to serve that end and whether it is the least restric-
tive alternative").
130 See id.; see also Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 875
(1997) (stating that a governmental interest in protecting
children "does not justify an unnecessarily broad suppression
of speech addressed to adults;" additionally, that "the govern-
ment may not 'reduc[e] the adult population . . . to ... only
what is fit for children' " (citing Denver Area EdtIc.
Telecomm. Consortium v. FCC, 518 U.S. 727, 802 (1996))).
131 See Telecommunications Act of 1996 § 504, 47 U.S.C.
§ 560 (1994 & Supp. I 1997).
132 Playboy Entertainment Group, 30 F. Stipp. 2d at 717.
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gramming channels fully scrambled upon their
request. 133
In order to determine which provision is less re-
strictive, it is important to look at the practical im-
plications of the provision. Section 505 has com-
pelled the majority of MSOs to comply by
initiating time-channeling of the adult program-
ming channels. 34 Thus, section 505 has dimin-
ished "Playboy's opportunities to convey, and the
opportunity of Playboy's viewers to receive, pro-
tected speech."' 135 Alternatively, section 504 is sig-
nificantly less restrictive of First Amendment
rights because it amounts to voluntary blocking;
no cable subscriber will be prohibited from view-
ing their choice of programming. 
36
In addition to being a less restrictive alternative
to the challenged regulation, section 504 must
also be as effective as the challenged regula-
tion. 137 The district court found that section 504
was an effective alternative if cable subscribers
were given adequate notice of its availability.' 38
The court encouraged Playboy, through its con-
tractual obligations with the MSOs, to ensure that
MSOs give adequate notice. 39 In opposition to
the court's "enhanced version of section 504," the
government argued that it has an obligation to
protect all children from signal bleed, including
those children whose parents, through "inertia,
indifference, or distraction," have not taken the
initiative to block it.140 When the Supreme Court
raised this issue at oral arguments, counsel for
Playboy responded by asserting that effective no-
tice, through video announcements and written
notice, would be an adequate way to notify the
parents. 41 It was also stated that if the parents did
not respond to such notice, the lack of response
would serve as further evidence that the parents
were not concerned about the potential of a sig-
133 See Telecommunications Act of 1996 § 505, 47 U.S.C.
§ 561 (1994 & Supp. i1 1997); Telecommunications Act of
1996 § 504, 47 U.S.C. § 560.
134 See Playboy Entertainment Group, 30 F. Supp. 2d at 717.
135 Id. at 718.
136 See id. (explaining that any cable subscriber who re-
quests a blocking device will be provided one free of charge,
while all Playboy subscribers will be able to receive the pro-
gramming 24 hours a day).
137 See id. (applying this analysis and noting that the less
restrictive alternative must also be a "viable alternative").
138 See id. at 719.
139 See id. at 720.
140 See Supreme Court Appellant's Brief, supra note 54, at
*33.
141 See Supreme Court Oral Arguments, supra note 54, at
nal bleed problem. 142
The effectiveness of section 504 is inherently
tied to its economic feasibility. The district court
in its findings of fact appeared to accept the gov-
ernment's findings that if only three to six per-
cent of cable subscribers requested lockboxes, the
cost of such distribution would exceed the "break-
even" point, defined as "the point at which the
cost of distributing lockboxes would exhaust all of
a cable system's adult channel revenues."' 14 3 The
court also appeared to accept the theory that such
an economic impact would cause the cable opera-
tors to cease carrying the adult channels. 14 4 In
contrast, Playboy presented information asserting
that the government has "vastly overestimate[d]
compliance costs" and the break-even point is
when eighty percent of cable subscribers request
lockboxes. 4 5 While the court acknowledged the
government's statistics in its findings of fact, it did
not address the issue in its conclusions of law.
146
While the Court will undoubtedly question the
economic feasibility of section 504 (and it does
not appear that the Court is satisfied with the dis-
trict court's treatment of this issue),' 147 the ques-
tion it must ultimately address is whether section
504 is less restrictive of our First Amendment
rights than section 505, not whether it is more in-
trusive into the MSOs' wallets.
b. The V-Chip
While the awareness of section 504 would help
to prevent signal bleed in homes where it is un-
wanted, there are still other alternatives to block-
ing signal bleed. As technology advances, more
parental control devices become available; for ex-
ample, the v-chip.' 48 The v-chip, in conjunction
with a rating system, can be used to block specific
*44-45.
142 See id.
143 United States v. Playboy Entertainment Group, Inc.,
30 F. Supp. 2d 702, 713 (D. Del. 1998) (examining the evi-
dence, the court found that that the -"distribution of boxes is
not feasible for a cable system" and thus "[e]conomic theory
would suggest that profit-maximizing cable operators would
cease carriage of adult channels").
144 See id.
145 See Supreme Court Appellee's Brief, supra note 70, at
*47.
14" See Playboy Entertainment Group, 30 F. Supp. 2d at
713-20.
147 See Supreme Court Oral Arguments, supra note 54, at
*52-54.
148 See Amy Fitzgerald Ryan, Don't Touch That V-Chip: A
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programs that parents do not want their children
to see. 14 9 The v-chip is a device implanted into
televisions that reads the rating information en-
coded on the television programs and blocks the
programs based on the ratings specified by the
parent. 150 On March 12, 1998, the FCC adopted
an order implementing a voluntary rating system
and requirements for technical television equip-
ment that would enable the v-chip to be a viable
alternative for parents. 15 1 The rules implemented
by the FCC required half of all television models
thirty-three centimeters and larger to be
equipped with the v-chip by July 1, 1999, and all
such models to contain the v-chip by January 1,
2000.152 At the time of the implementation of the
v-chip regulation, the FCC addressed the poten-
tial First Amendment issues that could arise be-
cause the v-chip was potentially a speech regula-
tion.' 53 Upon review, the FCC stated that the
regulation "prudently provided an alternative to a
government-created, government-policed scheme
for judging the content of video programming:
the establishment of a private, voluntary ratings
system by video programming distributors."1
54
c. Safe-Harbor Hours
The government is likely to argue that regard-
less of the preceding discussion, section 505 is
constitutional because it allows for adult program-
Constitutional Defense of the Television Program Rating Provisions
of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, 87 GEO. L.J. 823, 825
(1999) (defining the v-chip as a "device that allows viewers to
block the display of programs that carry a common rating").
149 See Commission Finds Industry Video Programming Rating
System Acceptable, Adopts Technical Requirements to Enable Block-
ing of Video Programming (Rpt. No. GN 98-3), FCC News, Mar.
12, 1998 [hereinafter Rating System Release]
150 See Viewing Television Responsibly: The V-Chip (visited
Jan. 22, 2000) <www.fcc.gov/vchip>. But see Supreme Court
Appellant's Brief, supra note 54, at *36 n.25 (stating that Play-
boy had conceded that the v-chip did not address the prob-
lem of signal bleed "because the imperfect scrambling that
creates the problem of signal bleed distorts or obliterates the
program classification (ratings) codes that the v-chip must in-
terpret in order to block the programming); cf Supreme
Court Appellee's Brief, supra note 70, at *42 n.59 (agreeing
that Playboy acknowledged that the v-chip was not designed
to prevent signal bleed but disagreeing that the v-chip does
not work to block signal bleed because since the trial, the
FCC has adopted rules that enable parents to block unrated
programming through the v-chip).
151 See Viewing Television Responsibly: The V-Chip, (visited
Jan, 22, 2000) <www.fcc.gov/vchip> (explaining that the rat-
ing system applies to all television programming except news,
sports, and certain premium movies; children's shows are
rated TV-Y, TV-Y7, and TV-Y7-FV; general programming is
ming to be shown during the safe harbor
hours. 155 Although use of safe harbor hours was
validated by the Court in FCC v. Pacifica Founda-
tion,1 5 1 crucial differences between Pacifica and
the present case may make safe-harbor hours in-
applicable.
First, the narrow holding in Pacifica applied
only to one specific broadcast. 157 The Court con-
sidered the FCC's ability to regulate one perform-
ance after that performance had been broadcast
over radio.'58 The Court "emphatically declined
to authorize the FCC 'to edit proposed in advance
and to excise material considered inappropriate
for the airwaves' broadcasts."' 159 Because the
Court has rejected prior restraint as a method for
regulating indecent speech, Pacifica cannot be
used to automatically validate safe harbor hours
on cable television.
Second, Pacifica reviewed a broadcast that was
disseminated on public radio; the fact that the
regulation in question refers to cable television
changes the scope of the inquiry drastically. One
relevant issue is that, at the time of Pacifica, the
objected broadcast was a "dramatic departure
from traditional program content." 6" In contrast,
the adult programming that is regulated by sec-
tion 505 has regularly been available on cable tel-
evision.' 6 ' Furthermore, unlike radio broadcasts,
which were deemed pervasive in Pacifica, cable tel-
evision is not available to everyone.'I l-Cable tele-
rated TV-G, TV-PG, TV-14, and TV-MA).
152 See Rating System Release, supra note 149.
15 See In re Implementation of Section 551 of the Tele-
communications Act of 1996: Video Programming Ratings,
Report and Order, 13 FCC Rcd. 8232, 8247 (1998) (separate
statement of Comm. Harold W. Furchtgott-Roth)
154 Id.
155 See United States v. Playboy Entertainment Group,
Inc., 30 F. Supp. 2d 702, 717 (D. Del. 1998); see also Becker v.
FCC, 95 F.3d 75, 84 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (referring to the safe
harbor hours as "broadcast Siberia").
156 438 U.S. 726 (1978).
157 See Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 742 (holding that the decision
only applied to the "specific factual context").
158 See id.
159 Supreme Court Appellee's Brief, supra note 70, at
*22-23.
160 Id. at *23 (citing FINAL REPORT, THE ATTORNEY GEN-
ERAL'S COMMISSION ON PORNOGRAPrlY 282 (1986)).
161 See Supreme Court Appellee's Brief, supra note 70, at
*23.
162 See United States v. Playboy Entertainment Group,
Inc., 30 F. Supp. 2d 702, 706 (D. Del. 1998) (referring to the
subscription prices for various cable television packages); but
see Reno, 521 U.S. at 854 (stating, "Unlike communications
received by radio or television, 'the receipt of information on
the Internet requires a series of affirmative steps more delib-
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vision is subscription programming that also of-
fers numerous options for blocking unwanted
programming. 63 Thus, the safe harbor hours that
were used in Pacifica are no longer needed be-
cause there are other ways to prevent children
from seeing or hearing the adult program-
ming. 164
C. Section 505 May Fail Due to Vagueness
One final issue that the Court will undoubtedly
address is whether section 505 can survive a con-
stitutional challenge of vagueness. The District
Court for the District of Delaware did not address
this issue in its opinion in 1998.1' However, in its
review of the preliminary injunction, the court
ruled that section 505 clearly survived Playboy's
vagueness claim based on the Court's decision in
Denver Area Educational Telecommunications Consor-
tium.'6 6 However, there is a strong possibility that
the Court will find section 505 to be vague. The
Court is likely to focus on Reno v. ACLU, where it
invalidated portions of the Communications De-
cency Act due to vagueness. 16 7 In that decision,
the Court noted that the statute was a content-
based regulation and that the criminal punish-
ment for violation was severe.' 68 While section
505 does not impose a severe criminal penalty, it
is a content-based regulation.'
16
9
Although section 505 initially did not define
"indecency," the enacted regulation defined inde-
cent sexually explicit adult programming as "any
programming that describes or depicts sexual or
excretory activities or organs in a patently offen-
sive manner as measured by contemporary com-
munity standards for the cable or other mul-
tichannel video programming distribution
medium."'1 70 Therefore, pursuant to section 505,
the FCC will determine what is indecent at a na-
erate and directed than merely turning a dial. A child re-
quires some sophistication and some ability to read to re-
trieve material and thereby to use the Internet
unattended.' "). While the Court groups all television and ra-
dio together in the previous sentence, cable television is not
as readily accessible as public radio. Furthermore, adult pro-
gramming channels are generally not placed in the same vi-
cinity of children's channels, thts making it harder and more
unlikely for children to access these channels.
163 See supra part IV.B (discussing the alternatives to
time-channeling).
164 See id.
165 See Playboy Entertainment Group, 30 F. Supp. 2d 702.
166 See Playboy Entertainment Group, Inc. v. United
States, 945 F. Supp. 772, 791 (D. Del. 1996) (citing Denver
tional level rather than through an individual
community's standard.' 7' In Reno, the Court spe-
cifically noted that such standards must be
'judged by contemporary community standards"
rather than by a "national floor for socially re-
deeming value."' 72 Therefore, the question of
who will determine the indecency of the program-
ming is sure to raise issues for the Court.
IV. CONCLUSION: SECTION 505 IS AN
UNCONSTITUTIONAL CENSORSHIP OF
SPEECH
As the Supreme Court reviews Playboy's chal-
lenge to these restrictive government regulations,
it is likely to address both the First Amendment
issue, under a strict scrutiny standard, and the
vagueness doctrine. When the Court applies strict
scrutiny, it is likely to find that the government
has proven a compelling interest, but that section
505 is not the least restrictive means available to
protect that interest. Given the many available op-
tions for preventing children's exposure to inde-
cent programming, it is difficult to say that section
505 is the least restrictive alternative. To be cer-
tain, there is no replacement for parental supervi-
sion. However, where parental supervision is not
possible, parents still have various available safe-
guards. Concerned parents who do not have time
to regulate every program their children watch
can utilize the v-chip or request a free lockbox
from their cable operator.
This government regulation is aimed at protect-
ing children; there are various other ways to ac-
complish this goal. Unfortunately, the govern-
ment chose the means that is most restrictive of
adults' rights. Section 505 places a tremendous
burden on the financial capability of adult pro-
Area Educ. Telecomm. Consortium v. FCC, 518 U.S. 727
(1996)) (referring to the Court's flat rejection of the plain-
tiff's argument in Denver Consortium that the challenged regu-
lations were unconstitutionally vague since "the use of ac-
cepted terms imbued the statute with meaning").
167 See Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844 (1997).
168 See id. at 871-72.
169 See id. at 872 (stating that a vague, content-based reg-
ulation poses "special First Amendment concerns because of
its obvious chilling effect on the free speech").
17o) Telecommunications Act of 1996 § 505, 47 U.S.C.
§ 561 (1994 & Supp. Il 1997); see also 47 C.F.R. § 76.227
(1998).
171 See Reno, 521 U.S. at 862-64.
172 Id. at 873.
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gramming channels, and more importantly, it
places a substantial burden on free speech.
There is no doubt that much attention will di-
rected at the Court as it decides yet another First
Amendment case. While First Amendment juris-
prudence has been relatively unclear, the Court
has a chance to clarify its position on content-
based regulations. First, the Court should deter-
mine whether the government's undocumented
evidence is sufficient to establish a compelling in-
terest; the government's evidence on this point
was minimal at best. Second, the Court should
also make it clear that the "least restrictive" means
must be used if the government wants to achieve
its compelling interest. Because there are multi-
ple viable alternatives, the government has not
used the least restrictive means of regulation
through section 505. It is undoubtedly clear that
on November 30, 1999, at oral arguments before
the Supreme Court, the government appealed to
the Court's conscience to protect our children
from a societal ill. However, the Court can best
protect our children by preserving the integrity of
the First Amendment.
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